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Testing the effectiveness of the French work-sharing
reform: a forecasting approach
(Running title: The effectiveness of the French work-sharing reform)
Abstract
We analyze the macroeconomic impact of the French work-sharing reform
of 2000 (a reduction of standard working hours in combination with wage sub-
sidies). Using a vector error corr ction model (VECM) for several labor mar-
ket variables as well as inflation and output we produce out-of-sample forecasts
for 2000/2001. A comparison of these forecasts –which serve as a benchmark
simulation without structural shifts– to the realized values (with shifts) suggests
significant beneficial employment effects of the policy mix. Other shifts were
absent and thus cannot explain the outcome. Output, productivity, hourly labor
costs, and inflation are only transitorily affected or not at all.
JEL: E24, E27, C32
Keywords: unemployment, work-sharing, France, VECM, forecasting
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1 Introduction
At the turn of the millennium, the French unemployment rate decreased by 2.2%-
points (1999-2001) after more than a decade with stubbornly high unemployment.
The rest of the Eurozone experienced a decline as well, but the amount of 1.2%-points
was markedly lower (see table 1 below for this and other basic data). An analogous
feature can be observed in employment figures: after growth rates below average in
1995-1998, France experienced above average growth rates from 1999 to 2002. The
rest of the Eurozone shared the tendency of the movement, but not quite its extent.
This development may partly be attributed to the above Eurozone-average real
GDP growth in France (3.1% p.a. for France against 2.5% p.a. for the rest of the Eu-
rozone in 1997-2001). However, another event that had an important influence on the
economic environment of France during this period was a “work-sharing” reform. A
brief summary of the complex institutional setting could read as follows: On the one
hand, the standard workweek was reduced from 39 to 35 hours, first on a voluntary
basis coupled with incentive schemes conditional on employment creation (Robien act
1996, Aubry I act 1998), then on a compulsory basis (Aubry II act 2000). On the other
hand the following alleviations were offered to firms: Greater managerial flexibility
w.r.t. working time allocation (Robien, Aubry I), payroll tax cuts through lower so-
cial security contributions for employers (in all acts), and a negotiated mid-term wage-
income growth restraint.
The explicit aim of this policy mix was to reduce unemployment levels. Thus it is
interesting to analyze if the reform had any noticeable effect or if it was just ordinary
economic growth that did the work. Also from the perspective of economic theory it is
still an unsettled issue whether a reduction of standard hours (alone) will lead to more
or less unemployment since in most models the outcome is in general ambiguous.
Earlier studies provided mixed results, see below, and a general consensus has not
been reached. Recent empirical assessments of other work-sharing reforms have not
been positive, see Hunt (1999) or Cre´pon and Kramarz (2002). But the respective
2
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German and French/1982 reforms included persistent hourly wage hikes as income
compensation for workers and no alleviation for firms, such that the negative outcome
is perhaps not too surprising. However, the institutional environment of the recent
French reform was quite different which provides an interesting new perspective on
the issue of work-sharing.
The existing literature in the context of the recent French reform falls into roughly
three classes: First there were ex-ante simulations of several scenarios within macro
models (see e.g. DARES-BDF-OFCE 1998), second there is descriptive evidence (e.g.
DARES 2002), and finally micro data for selective samples of firms have been thor-
oughly analyzed (Bunel 2002, Passeron 2002). For those studies that allow drawing
conclusions with respect to employment effects, the results are mostly optimistic.
Our aim is to complement the literature by shedding some light on the macroe-
conomic consequences of the recent French work-sharing reform. To this end we
estimate an empirical system of labor market variables (as well as inflation and output)
using a vector error correction model (VECM) up to 1999. As there are two competing
possible break dates (namely 1999q4 and 2000q1, see section 3 for detailed results),
we actually estimate two slightly different models. With these models we can pro-
duce forecasts for the subsequent period, acknowledging the fact that those forecasts
are based on the previous institutional regime. A comparison to actual observations
after the introduction of the 35h work-week allows us to pinpoint significant changes.
For both models we get very similar results; we find that unemployment was reduced
throughout the analyzed horizon at the cost of a transitory depression of total hours
worked reflecting a short-run rise of hourly labor costs. Labor costs and inflation re-
main somewhat higher than their forecasts, but not significantly so. Output is forecast
quite well in every period and in general seems unaffected by the break.
These results can be attributed to the work-sharing-cum-lower-costs reform be-
cause other forces that could have had an influence on the unemployment rate were
absent: For example, the labor supply grew at normal rates (see table 1), if not faster
than usual. The coverage of active labor market policy actually declined somewhat
3
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during our forecast period (Boulard and Lerais 2002), which makes our estimates even
slightly conservative. National accounts data show that other stimuli such as an ex-
pansionary fiscal policy did not occur, and not even ECB officials or other pro-Euro
economists claimed that the introduction of the Euro would fight unemployment; in-
stead they have always called for structural labor market reforms. (Also recall that the
Euro was adopted already in the beginning of 1999, not in 2000.) But even if these
arguments are disputed, our real output forecast turns out to be surprisingly accurate,
such that potentially stimulating business-cycle effects would be controlled for.
The rest of this contribution is structured as follows: In the next section we provide
a brief survey of the relevant literature, we describe some institutional details of the re-
form, and we discuss estimates and implications of existing studies. Section 3 presents
the data and explains our model specification along with the resulting forecasts. The
final section summarizes the main findings.
[Tables 1 and 2 about here]
2 Theory, institutions, and existing evaluations
2.1 A glimpse at the recent work-sharing debate
Economists are usually very critical about work-sharing due to the “lump-of-labor”
fallacy, i.e. the assumption of a fixed labor input volume that is often implicitly made
in public debates on the issue (Layard, Nickell, and Jackman 1991, Snower 1997).
But most of the theoretical studies yield ambiguous predictions depending on what the
precise model or parameter values are.
For example, in the reference model of Calmfors and Hoel (1988) even the most
skeptical model variant predicts a definitely negative response of output and employ-
ment only if the overtime premium is constant. If a progressive premium system is
allowed instead, the response becomes uncertain. The predictions of the model by
FitzRoy, Funke, and Nolan (2002) are more optimistic, although it coincides with the
conclusions in Marimon and Zilibotti (2000), where the possible employment creation
4
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would lower firms’ profits. In contrast to that, a possible Pareto improvement is found
in the matching models by Rocheteau (2002) and by Ortega (2003), where lower stan-
dard hours may offer a firm more flexibility to react to demand shocks.
On the empirical side, the results are also mixed. Cre´pon and Kramarz (2002) ana-
lyze the reduction of 40 to 39 hours in 1982 for France. At that time full wage income
compensation without reorganizational possibilities were the norm. Not surprisingly,
they find a negative effect on employment. In Hunt (1999), a similar work-sharing
reform without wage moderation is analyzed for West Germany in 1984-1994. De-
pending on the data set and method used she finds mostly insignificant coefficients of
both signs. On the other hand, after conditioning on wages Franz and Ko¨nig (1986)
find a positive partial effect of normal hours reduction on employment for West Ger-
many (p. S241), although it is not mainly a study about work-sharing.1
In contrast to former experiences, the reforms that recently took place in France
implied working-time reduction against tax cuts and subsequent wage growth restraint.
This policy mix therefore may have been more effective than earlier work-sharing
attempts.
2.2 The institutional background in France
The shortening of the standard work-week was implemented in several stages. A first
act to reduce working-time (named Robien) was passed in June 1996. This voluntary
measure had only very little impact, covering only 0.3m employees between June 1996
and June 1998 (Passeron 2002).
The main reform project was implemented in two stages. First the Robien act
was replaced by the Aubry I act in June 1998 which lowered the legally standard
work-week to 35 hours. (Martine Aubry was the minister of labor between June 1997
and October 2000.) However, while it became effective for firms with more than 20
employees on January 1st, 2000, smaller firms would not be affected until January
2002. Additionally an incentive scheme was introduced to promote a quicker effective
work-week reduction. The most important exception in this legislation was the civil
5
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service (but not state-owned firms). There were about 16m employees potentially
affected by this reform (DARES 2002), of which about one third worked in small
firms. (The overall number of employees in France in 2001 was about 22m people.)
The Aubry I incentive scheme provided reductions of social security contributions
for firms that effectively reduced the work-week and guaranteed a certain level of
employment. A useful source for details is Passeron (2002). Among the firms with a
work-week reduction up to the end of 2001, 58% participated in the Aubry I incentive
scheme (this covers 28% of all workers that had their working time reduced).
The second stage (Aubry II, passed in December 1999/January 2000) confirmed
the 39 to 35 hours transition and instated a system of structural aids. For bigger firms
the Aubry I scheme was being phased out, whereas for smaller firms the end date is
2002. The structural aids depend on wage levels; the average tax reduction per year
and employee was EUR 1067 (Passeron 2002); it was not conditional on guaranteed
employment levels anymore. Furthermore the flexibility of varying weekly hours over
the course of a year was increased. For a transition period of one year, the overtime
premium for the first four hours was reduced from 25% to 10% (the next four hours re-
mained subject to a 25% premium and hours beyond that must be paid at 150%). This
working-time reduction was mostly accompanied by an initial wage income compen-
sation (Pham 2002). For example, in 2000 98% of all employees covered by Aubry II
enjoyed a full wage compensation; however, 1/3 had to accept a wage stagnancy and
14% a wage growth moderation for the following one to three years.
Finally it should be noted that in some sense the work-sharing experience is already
history, because right after its election in early 2002 the new center-right government
started to reverse the reform.
2.3 Previous evaluations
Apart from the already mentioned descriptive evidence in DARES (2002), the macroe-
conomic studies for France were based on ex-ante simulations e.g. within the macro
models of the OFCE institute, the central bank (BdF), and the ministry of finance
6
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(MINEFI). For a survey see Conseil Supe´rieur de l’emploi, des revenus et des couˆts
(1998), DARES-BDF-OFCE (1998), or Commissariat Ge´ne´ral du Plan (2001). De-
pending on the various assumptions the assessment of the employment effects range
from optimistic (up to 700,000 additional jobs in the simulations of the OFCE and
of the BdF) to more sceptical (between 200 and 300,000 according to MINEFI, even
negative if a blockade between unions and employers is assumed).
The existing microeconomic studies (based on observed data) use samples of firms
with specific characteristics, apparently due to data limitations. Passeron (2002) for
example only analyzes firms in the Aubry I scheme. He concludes that the employ-
ment gain induced by the work-week reduction is between 6 and 7.5%. (Effects where
firms become eligible for subsidies without having been induced to meet the crite-
ria are supposedly not included in those numbers.) The resulting productivity gain
effect in his study is 4% which is a little more than what is often assumed on theoret-
ical grounds. According to Passeron the government subsidies decreased total labor
costs of the Aubry I firms by 4%. In addition to that, Passeron estimates a beneficial
“anti-seniority” effect of 1%, because newly hired workers are cheaper relative to their
productivity. Wage moderation is seen as 0.8%, such that altogether the work-week
reduction was approximately cost-neutral over the horizon until 2002. This study is
not representative for aggregates, and even the sign of the bias is ambiguous: Firms
that waited until 2000 to reduce their work-week receive less subsidies but also have
less restructuring costs. Another study for selected firms is Bunel (2002), who uses a
special data set (“Passages”) to compare all firms that reduced their effective weekly
working time to 35 hours.
The existing macro evidence is only for scenarios, and it is not clear what the
selective micro studies imply for the aggregate level. An empirical macro analysis
therefore seems useful, and we now turn to it.
7
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3 Empirical methods and results
3.1 Variables and data
In the context of imperfect competition, prices and wages are set simultaneously by
economic agents, see e.g. Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991), where the unemploy-
ment rate gives some feedback to the system. Therefore we require the following
variables: wages, prices, an employment measure, real output, and the unemployment
rate.
For wages there are basically three possibilities: 1. Total compensation including
social security contributions paid by employers, which represents the total cost of a
labor unit; 2. “gross” wages that include only social security contributions and taxes
paid by the worker herself; 3. net wages without taxes or contributions. For price
setting and the labor demand total compensation is clearly the appropriate variable.
For wage setting the level of net wages could also be relevant, but we restrict ourselves
to the total compensation measure, not least because net wages is a time series which
is difficult to obtain.
Prices: For labor demand and price setting it is the GDP deflator which is impor-
tant, while adding the consumer price index (CPI) would make sense for wage setting
analysis. Here we chose to include only the GDP deflator. Note that both price indices
display roughly the same development (not shown), such that the exclusion of the CPI
is not problematic.
Employment can be the labor volume (in hours) or the number of employed people,
where average working time links the two concepts. As the hours worked per person
is a central variable for the present study we include both employment measures. For
real output it is natural to choose real GDP, and the chosen unemployment rate is the
one according to ILO definitions.
W.r.t. the selected variable set it might be argued that potentially important vari-
ables are missing. Apart from the price/tax wedge and import prices, there are many
possible extensions. For example capital user costs may play a significant role as part
8
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of marginal costs, and labor demand could also depend on the sectoral composition of
output. However, in this paper we do not follow up on these issues because our aim is
to work with a manageable labor market model. By analyzing the described data set
we have tried to follow a pragmatic middle-of-the-road approach.
The data are from the following sources: OECD, the French statistical office (IN-
SEE), and the statistical department of the French labor ministry (DARES); all series
are seasonally adjusted. The variable names, a survey of the sources and calculation
methods are given in table 3. We present the analyzed time series in figure 1 with some
anticipated transformations: LWRealt = LWt − LPYt will denote the hourly real
wage, and Inflt = ∆LPYt(∗400) is essentially the first difference of the log price
level, i.e. the inflation rate.
Our general sample choice is determined by two facts: Data on hours worked are
only available from 1980 on, and it turns out that there is instability in the unemploy-
ment rate equation already towards the end of 1999, see the system analysis below
for more details. Thus the estimation period is set to 1980q1-1999q3, where the first
observations will be used as starting values for the necessary lagged regressors.
[Table 3 about here]
[Figure 1 about here]
3.2 Preliminary univariate data analysis
Obviously the inflation rate displays a very persistent behavior, such that using the
price level in the model would be difficult. But the inflation rate itself can well be in-
cluded as an integrated series (I(1)) in the multivariate system. Instead of the nominal
wage we therefore include the real wage “LWReal” (≡ LW − LPY ) in the system.
The variable vector is thus given by:
yt = (URt, LEMPt, LYt, Inflt, LWRealt, LV olt)
′ (1)
The results of standard unit root tests are shown in table 4. For all series the null
9
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hypothesis of a unit root cannot be rejected, with the possible exception of the labor
volume. This does not pose any problems per se, but another test in the system context
would still be interesting (see below).
[Table 4 about here]
Before moving to the system analysis we perform a simple univariate forecast
of unemployment after the reduction of standard hours. Here we apply the standard
ARIMA model for the sample 1978q2-1999q3. We impose the unit root restriction
and after eliminating insignificant terms arrive at an ARIMA(3,1,2) specification. The
forecasts derived from this model beyond 1999q3 are displayed in figure 2 along with
the forecast error confidence bands and the actually observed development. The devel-
opment of UR is clearly overestimated; actually, this model treats the unemployment
rate more or less as a random walk and thus simply sets the forecast close to the last
observed value. This automatically raises the question whether the information con-
tained in other variables enables us to produce better forecasts, or if the forecast failure
is due to a policy-induced structural break.
[Figure 2 about here]
3.3 The multivariate forecasting model
Our statistical framework is the vector autoregressive model (VAR) with Gaussian
innovations that is widely used in empirical macroeconomics.2 We combine the n = 6
variables in the column vector yt for t = 1, ..., T , where in our case T refers to 1999q3
or 1999q4, depending on the model variant, see below. Then the VAR has the following
shape:
yt =
K∑
k=1
Φkyt−k + τt+ µ+ t (2)
As deterministics a constant µ and a linear trend (serving as a proxy for technical
progress etc., with coefficient τ ) are allowed. After the appropriate reparametrization
10
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the following vector error correction model (VECM) is obtained:
∆yt = Πyt−1 +
K−1∑
k=1
Γk∆yt−k + τt+ µ+ t (3)
We adopt the conventional denomination for the matrix of the cointegration vec-
tors, β, and the matrix of adjustment coefficients, α, both of dimension n × r for a
given cointegration rank r, such that Π = αβ′. The linear trend can only appear in the
cointegrating relations, i.e. we impose τ = αρ′ (ρ freely varying).
First a choice about the number of lags in the VAR needs to be made. We use a
maximum of six lags, as this already means estimating 36+2 parameters in each equa-
tion. The Schwartz and HQ information criteria suggest K = 2, only the (inconsistent)
Akaike criterion chooses K = 6. However, because of remaining residual autocorre-
lation with two lags we are led to a choice of K = 3. A single outlier in 1984q1
(especially in the unemployment equation) distorts the otherwise Gaussian properties
of the innovations, such that we include a restricted impulse dummy for that observa-
tion.3 Then the residual diagnostics are fully satisfactory, see table 5.
[Table 5 about here]
The rank of the matrix Π is an important property of the system, although it is not
as crucial for forecasts as it would be for other analyses. We apply the well-known
Johansen procedure accounting for a restricted trend, see table 6. Johansen (1995)
shows that this test procedure is unbiased if the rank tests are interpreted as a sequence,
starting from rank zero and stopping at the first insignificant test statistic. At first sight
the standard trace test statistics (in the third column) are all significant, and thus the
conclusion would be a (trend) stationary VAR without any unit roots in the system.
Apart from the fact that this would contradict the univariate unit root test evidence, it
would be a highly unusual finding for macroeconomic time series.
However, the rank test is substantially oversized in small samples (i.e. it rejects
too often although the null hypothesis is true), and thus this nominal result may be
exaggerated. Fortunately, there exists a novel method to investigate this suspicion.
11
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Following the Bartlett correction principle, Johansen (2002) develops a correction fac-
tor w.r.t. the rank test statistic. The idea is to find the expected value of the test statistic
for given models in small samples, compare that to the asymptotic value and derive
the corresponding correcting factor. It is obvious that this factor depends on nuisance
parameters that are asymptotically (and hence for the standard test setup) irrelevant.
The factor is applied to the measured test statistic and thereby the bias of the test is
decreased. Simulation studies show a beneficial effect.
In order to calculate the Bartlett corrections for the last four null hypotheses, we
estimated the VAR four times with the respective rank under the null to obtain the
necessary estimates of the parameter matrices. These were entered into the program of
Johansen (2002); the lag length is still fixed at K = 3. The results of this procedure are
provided in the last column of table 6, and the test conclusions change considerably:
We have to stop at H0 : r = 4 when interpreting the sequence of corrected trace
tests, as this is the first non-rejected hypothesis. This choice implies that n − r =
2 independent stochastic trends drive the system which is a reasonable property of
such a model. The results are not entirely straightforward because of the fact that –
viewed in isolation– H0 : r = 5 is also rejected. However, this is irrelevant for the
appropriate testing strategy of the Johansen procedure as explained before. Unreported
evidence about the estimated characteristic roots of the system also supports the choice
of exactly two unit roots. Therefore we proceeded with an imposed cointegration rank
of r = 4.
[Table 6 about here]
It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a structural analysis of the French
labor market. This aspect and the relatively high cointegration rank induced us to
refrain from an economic identification of the cointegrating relationships. However,
we checked that no harmful normalizations were used, e.g. no zero parameters were
normalized to unity.
We can now investigate a number of hypotheses within the cointegrated VAR:
First we return to the trend stationarity of the (log) labor volume. We test this as the
12
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hypothesis that LVol alone is one of the components of the cointegration space. The LR
test of this restriction cannot reject, with χ2(2) = 3.76, p = 0.15. A second interesting
question is whether the linear trend is actually needed in the cointegrating relations.
The corresponding exclusion is clearly rejected (χ2(4) = 32.1, p = 0.00), so the trend
is essential for an adequate model. Finally, note that output does not adjust to any
equilibrium deviations (tested as a zero row in the α matrix, χ2(4) = 3.56, p = 0.47),
and is thus weakly exogenous for the long-run parameters. This partly explains why
we find that output is mostly unaffected by the structural break, see below.
3.4 Stability of the model and choice of breakpoint
The final check of the model is about its stability. Especially for our purposes a sta-
ble specification in the estimation period is obviously a desirable feature because an
unstable model would not yield meaningful forecasts.
Several recursively estimated test statistics indicate that parameter stability for the
described sample up to 1999q3 clearly holds, see figures 3 through 5. This means
that the quantitative impact of the previous reforms –Robien and Aubry I as described
before– was small and could easily be subsumed under the error term.
[Figures 3, 4, and 5 about here]
However, based on the a priori information about the beginning of the reform
we originally conjectured that any potential structural break should have happened
in 2000q1. But when we add the observation 1999q4 to the estimation period, there
is clear-cut evidence for instability at least in the unemployment equation (see figure
6), reflecting an unusual decline of the unemployment rate. As the coming reform
was publicly known in the end of 1999, this suggests that announcement effects were
already at work; the favorable product demand environment during that time probably
helped, too.
[Figure 6 about here]
Given these findings, our strategy for the forecast test is to check both breakpoints
1999q4 and 2000q1 in the following way: For 1999q4, we simply estimate the model
13
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until T = 1999q3 as described before and start our system forecast immediately af-
terwards. For the 2000q1 break date variant, we extend the estimation period until
T = 1999q4, but introduce an impulse dummy for the last observation to account for
the significant stability failure documented in figure 6. (This impulse dummy is not
restricted to the cointegration space.) Note that the second variant is quite conserva-
tive in the sense that no movements before 2000q1 are attributed to the work- sharing
reform.
Before we apply the forecasting model, note also that several robustness analyses
were done in the course of preparing this paper, varying both the number of lags, the
cointegration rank, and applying several model reduction strategies. The forecasts on
which our interest is centered were always very similar.
3.5 Forecasts and reality
Now we are in the position to answer the central question of this study, namely if the
policy of reducing standard hours in combination with wage subsidies had a significant
influence on the unemployment rate and other variables. To this end we compare the
observed development of the vector yt until 2001q2 (i.e. yT+h, h = 1...H) and the
corresponding dynamic forecasts yfT+h = ET (yT+h), which are conditional on sam-
ple information up to T . These are computed recursively using the estimated VECM
coefficient matrices. For the first variant we have T = 1999q3 and H = 7, whereas
the second variant uses T = 1999q4 and H = 6 (with an impulse dummy in 1999q4).
Our approach is related to the test of Box and Tiao (1976) which however is about
the joint significance of the forecast errors; a more detailed interpretation is possible
by considering the forecast errors separately. (The variance formulae for the entire
sequence of forecast errors can also be found in Clements and Hendry (1998).)
In line with our strategy of considering both 1999q3 and 1999q4 as potential break-
points, we present two sets of corresponding graphs in figures 7 and 8. There are some
quite interesting results to be pointed out:
[Figures 7 and 8 about here]
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• The forecast of the unemployment rate (UR) falls slightly, but its confidence
bands drift apart quickly and become extremely large. In spite of this the ob-
served development of unemployment is significantly lower than the forecast.
• Consequently, the employment development (LEMP) is consistently underesti-
mated. At the end of the forecast horizon the discrepancy of the forecast w.r.t.
reality constitutes about 0.5 million additional employed workers.
• The real output (LY) is forecast surprisingly well, so in this sense no extraordi-
nary goods market developments were responsible for the fall of the unemploy-
ment rate.
• There is nothing important to be seen in the inflation path, especially no dramatic
rise because of rising labor costs. However, the reliability of the forecast is very
low, given the extremely wide confidence bands stretching far into the negative
range.
• W.r.t. real hourly labor costs (LWReal) there is an unpredicted increase in the
beginning despite the paid subsidies. (The maximal difference between reality
and forecast is about 2%.) This is not surprising since an initial income com-
pensation had been negotiated which represents a short-run hourly wage hike.
However, this is gradually eliminated by subsequent wage growth restraint.
• Finally we observe a quite drastic slump of the labor volume (LVol) especially
in 2000q1, although this is slowly offset in the following quarters. It seems as if
the path of the labor volume relative to its forecast were partly a mirror image of
the development of labor costs. One would probably not have expected that the
labor volume after seven quarters is hardly distinguishable from its (forecast)
normal path.
During the forecast horizon higher labor costs correspond to higher productivity
(LY − LV ol) and somewhat higher inflation, although not all these deviations are
significant. Towards the end of the forecast horizon average hourly productivity is
15
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back on track, a fact which also holds for labor costs, at least in the 2000q1-breakpoint
specification.
These developments make sense in a model where the increased individual pro-
ductivity due to less working hours is subsequently offset by lower productivity of the
formerly unemployed. It also implies that the labor cost subsidies were an important
factor of the policy mix.
As was already mentioned in the introduction, other obvious effects that might
have affected unemployment were not present during the forecast period. For exam-
ple, there was no hidden expansion of active labor market policies; the number of
the covered workers even dropped in 2000 (Boulard and Lerais 2002). Overall fiscal
deficits were also reduced in comparison with the 1998-1999 period (source: INSEE
national accounts data). There was no sign of other labor supply shifts happening
(again, see the labor force developments in table 1), and the overall economic climate
is captured quite well by our implicit empirical output model.
Hence we conclude that there exists relatively strong evidence that the French
work-sharing-cum-labor-cost-subsidies reform was responsible for the lower unem-
ployment rate at least in 2000-2001 and in this sense was successful.
4 Summary
As the effects of a reduction of standard hours are not predictable on purely theoretical
grounds, it is the task of empirical studies to determine the efficacy of such policy
options. The present paper provides evidence for the case of France, where a reduction
of weekly standard hours in the beginning of 2000 was accompanied by subsidies of
the social security contributions.
Detailed firm level data only exist for subgroups of firms that are not represen-
tative; also, labor demand is only part of the story behind unemployment and wage
developments. Therefore we used aggregate data to measure possible influences of the
reform. We specified an empirical macroeconomic labor market model and examined
16
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the differences between observed data and the dynamic model forecasts in the horizon
between the end of 1999 and mid 2001. Given that the economic environment is either
captured within our model (most importantly demand conditions) or remained stable
in France during our forecast period (most importantly active labor market policy), the
effect can only be attributed to the mentioned reforms.
Our analysis of the development of unemployment and other variables in France
imply that the reduction of standard hours in combination with the offered wage subsi-
dies was at least partly successful. This finding is significant in the sense that it holds
after accounting for the forecast uncertainty. Although there was a short-term wage
push and the labor input volume (in hours) displayed a sudden slump (implying higher
productivity in the short run), wages and labor demand afterwards slowly recovered
from this disturbance. Together with the shorter working hours, this meant that the
employment level grew faster than its forecast. But above all, the unemployment rate
fell more than would have been predicted on the basis of the old policy regime. Real
output as well as the inflation rate seemed relatively unaffected.
Given the various preceding stages of the work-sharing reform project, our ap-
proach of dating the structural break not earlier than 1999q4 may be criticized, al-
though the average working time data in table 2 reveal that notable changes only occur
around 1999q4/2000q1. Furthermore, our model is empirically stable until the end of
1999 which also suggests that the effects of the preliminary reforms are not quantita-
tively important. But even in a broader sense an earlier and “smoother” structural break
would not invalidate our analysis, either: The observed decrease in unemployment in
1998-1999 is not counted as caused by the reform by choice of our breakpoint date.
Therefore, our tests are actually somewhat conservative in the sense that the overall
impact of the reform in terms of unemployment reduction was probably even bigger.
All things considered, the mix of imposing restructuring costs on firms while at the
same time offering cost alleviation in favor of unemployed workers apparently was a
good choice. But of course this relatively radical reform only helped roughly one fifth
of all unemployed, and unemployment in France remained a mass phenomenon.
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Notes
1This list of empirical studies is of course not complete, but conveys the status
quo of the research, namely that evidence is diverse, and that a consensus has not
been reached. Further references are given in Ortega (2003), Marimon and Zilibotti
(2000), and Hunt (1999). The link between actual hours and legal hours was studied
for the U.S. by Trejo (1991) and Costa (2000), arguing that work-sharing is irrelevant
if firms and workers negotiate a constant compensation/workload-package. They find
non-neutrality of lower working hours, whereas in Trejo (2001) irrelevance of work-
sharing cannot be rejected.
2For a textbook treatment see Lu¨tkepohl (1991), and for the theory of a VAR with
cointegration Johansen (1995). The reported results were computed mainly with Pc-
Give 10, see Doornik and Hendry (2001), with the exception of the Bartlett correction
of the rank test which was performed with the program for RATS mentioned in Jo-
hansen (2002).
3
“Restricted” means that the impulse dummy i84q1t({. . . , 0, 0, 1, 0, 0, . . .}) is only
allowed in the levels of the data and not in the differences. This is achieved by includ-
ing i84q1t in the cointegration space and its difference ∆i84q1t unrestrictedly in the
VAR.
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A Data Appendix
The DARES publishes the average working time of full-time employees in each quarter
on the basis of the ACEMO survey carried out among employers. However, this data
covers only plants with more than ten employees in the non-agricultural private sectors
(hereafter competitive sector, excluding civil service, health services, etc. with about 6
to 7 million employees in the 1990’s). This is equal to the average working-time of all
employees under two assumptions: first full-time employees of small plants (less than
10 employees) work as long as those in medium and large companies, and second, the
working time in the c mpetitive sector is the same as in the rest of the economy. (As
we use the log of the data, a weaker assumption is actually sufficient, namely that the
ratio of the different working hours is constant.)
The INSEE provides the number of full-time equivalent employees, thus part-time
effects are corrected for.
The volume of paid hours is thus the product of the average working time of all
full-time employees and the number of full-time equivalent employees.
However, starting in 1998 the effects of the shortening of the work-week became
noticeable, which up to 2002 concerned almost exclusively bigger firms. We therefore
applied a correction which only transmits part of the working time changes (published
by the DARES and concerning bigger plants) to the working time of all plants. Thus we
modify our first assumption by holding the working time of small plants unchanged.4
As bigger firms employ about two thirds of all employees (source: Eurostat, News
releases, Memo No 01/99, 10 March 1999) the correction beginning in 1998 is:
g[WorkingT imeall full-time employees] = 2/3 ∗ g[WorkingT imepublished by DARES]
with g[.] denominating the quarterly growth rate.
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Figures
Figure 1: Time series graphs
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Remarks: Left panel: the components of the vector yt. Right panel: the time differences. The
inflation rate is expressed in (approximate) annual growth rates.
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Figure 2: Univariate forecast of the unemployment rate starting in 1999q4
2000 2001
0.10
0.12
Level UR Forecasts Actual 
Remarks: Forecasts of the unemployment rate (UR) in France 1999q4-2001q2. The (95%)
forecast error confidence bands take into account the innovation variances as well as param-
eter uncertainty.
Figure 3: Recursive eigenvalues
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Remarks: These are the recursively estimated paths of eigenvalues from the reduced rank
regression under the restriction of cointegration rank r = 4; fluctuating estimates would hint
at instabilities of the cointegration space.
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Figure 4: Chow breakpoint tests
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Remarks: Test statistics based on forecasts from the respective dates on the x-axis until the
end of the sample, and scaled relative to the 5% critical value which is normalized to unity.
The underlying model is the one described in the text, with K = 3 lags and cointegration rank
r = 4.
Figure 5: Chow forecasts tests
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Remarks: Test statistics based on forecasts from a fixed date on the left of the x-axis until the
respective dates on the x-axis, and scaled relative to the 5% critical value which is
normalized to unity.
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Figure 6:
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Remarks: The Chow test statistics are based on recursive 1-step forecast errors that are scaled
relative to the (1%) critical value which is normalized to unity.
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Figure 7: VECM forecasts, break date 1999q4
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Remarks: The bands denote the 95% forecast confidence intervals taking into account the
innovation variance as well as parameter uncertainty.
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Figure 8: VECM forecasts, break date 2000q1
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Remarks: The bands denote the 95% forecast confidence intervals taking into account the
innovation variance as well as parameter uncertainty. The estimation sample includes the ob-
servation 1999q4, but corrected with an impulse dummy due to the stability failure documented
in figure 6.
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Tables
Table 1: Comparison of the macroeconomic context between France and the Eurozone
EU EU w/o Fr France EU EU w/o Fr France EU EU w/o Fr France EU EU w/o Fr France
real GDP1 Employment1 Labor costs1,2 Population1
1990 2.6 1.0 0.5
1991 1.0 0.2 2.8 0.5
1992 1.5 1.5 1.5 -0.9 -1.0 -0.7 7.3 7.7 5.9 0.5 0.5 0.5
1993 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -2.0 -2.2 -1.2 3.2 2.4 5.7 0.5 0.5 0.4
1994 2.4 2.4 2.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 2.5 2.5 2.2 0.3 0.3 0.4
1995 2.3 2.4 1.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 0.3 0.3 0.4
1996 1.4 1.5 1.1 0.6 0.6 0.5 2.8 2.9 2.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
1997 2.3 2.5 1.9 0.8 0.9 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3
1998 2.9 2.7 3.4 1.9 1.9 1.7 0.8 0.5 1.8 0.2 0.2 0.4
1999 2.8 2.7 3.2 2.1 2.0 2.1 2.8 2.7 3.0 0.3 0.2 0.4
2000 3.5 3.4 3.8 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7 2.8 2.2 0.4 0.3 0.5
2001 1.4 1.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 2.3 2.7 2.8 2.5 0.4 0.4 0.5
2002 0.8 0.7 1.2 0.4 0.3 0.6 2.5 2.5 2.6 0.4 0.3 0.5
Inflation rate (CPI)2 Employees1 Productivity1,5 Population (15-64)1
1990 1.5 1.6
1991 4.3 3.4 0.8 0.8 0.0
1992 3.8 2.5 -1.2 -1.4 -0.1 2.5 2.6 2.2 0.5 0.5 0.2
1993 3.4 2.2 -1.7 -1.9 -0.8 1.2 1.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2
1994 2.8 1.7 -0.4 -0.6 0.6 2.4 2.6 1.9 0.3 0.3 0.2
1995 2.6 1.8 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.6 1.8 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
1996 2.3 2.3 2.1 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.3
1997 1.7 1.7 1.3 0.8 0.9 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.5 0.2 0.2 0.3
1998 1.2 1.3 0.7 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.0 0.8 1.7 0.2 0.1 0.3
1999 1.1 1.2 0.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.7 0.6 1.1 0.1 0.1 0.3
2000 2.1 2.2 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.8 1.1 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
2001 2.4 2.5 1.8 1.6 1.4 2.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 0.3 0.2 0.4
2002 2.3 2.3 1.9 0.6 0.5 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.3 0.3 0.5
Real eff. exch. rate (CPI)2 Unemployment rate2,3 Unit labor costs1,2 Labor force1,4
1990 8.7 3.2 8.6 -1.6
1991 -2.8 -3.6 9.1 2.0 0.6
1992 3.7 1.3 10.0 4.8 5.1 3.6 0.0 -0.1 0.4
1993 -5.3 -2.2 10.1 9.9 11.3 2.0 1.0 5.4 0.0 -0.1 0.2
1994 -0.5 -0.6 10.8 10.6 11.8 0.1 -0.1 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.7
1995 6.2 1.4 10.6 10.4 11.3 1.8 1.6 2.2 0.4 0.4 0.3
1996 0.7 1.2 10.8 10.6 11.9 2.0 2.1 1.7 0.8 0.7 1.0
1997 -6.9 -2.9 10.8 10.6 11.8 -1.2 -1.2 -1.1 0.8 0.8 0.4
1998 2.7 0.4 10.2 10.0 11.4 -0.2 -0.3 0.1 1.3 1.4 1.0
1999 -3.8 -2.4 9.4 9.1 10.7 2.0 2.1 1.9 0.9 0.8 1.3
2000 -8.2 -5.8 8.5 8.3 9.3 1.5 1.7 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.0
2001 2.6 -0.5 8.0 7.9 8.5 2.9 2.9 3.0 0.9 0.8 1.0
2002 3.4 0.2 8.4 8.3 8.8 2.1 2.1 2.1 0.9 0.8 1.1
All numbers are growth rates (yoy) in %, except for the unemployment rate, which is in level and in %. “EU” is the Euro area.
1 AMECO, own calculations
2 EUROSTAT, own calculations
3 harmonized
4 labor force statistics
5 measured as output per head
Source: AMECO, Eurostat, own calculations
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Table 2: Different measures of working time
1999q1 1999q2 1999q3 1999q4 2000q1 2000q2 2000q3 2000q4
ACEMO (2003)1 38.6 38.6 38.3 38.0 37.2 36.9 36.8 36.6
-0.1 -0.2 -0.6 -0.7 -2.2 -0.7 -0.4 -0.4
DARES (2003)2 36.5 36.5 36.3 36.1 35.7 35.4 35.4 35.3
-0.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.6 -1.1 -0.7 -0.2 -0.2
our data3 38.7 38.7 38.6 38.4 38.0 37.7 37.5 37.4
-0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.5 -1.0 -1.0 -0.4 -0.3
The numbers in italics are quarterly growth rates in %.
1 Working time published by the MES-DARES from the poll ACEMO. This data refers to firms with more than
10 employees and full-time employees. It stems from the DARES database (as of November 2003).
2 Working-time calculated by the MES-DARES correcting the results of ACEMO for firms with less than
10 employees and part-time employees. It corrects additionally for a statistical break of the definition of the
working-time in 2000 induced by AUBRY II. This figure was published in the DARES database (as of Novem-
ber 2003). Note that this series could not be used in our analysis because it only dates back to 1993.
3 See the appendix for the exact calculation.
Table 3: Description of the data
Abbrev. Meaning Source / details
UR unemployment rate Standardized unemployment rate (ILO
concept) from the OECD.
LEMP number of employed workers
(log of)
Source INSEE.
LY real GPD (1995 prices, log of) From OECD Main Economic Indica-
tors (MEI).
LPY GDP deflator (log of) From OECD MEI. The first difference
(times 400 to achieve approximate an-
nual growth rates) is the inflation rate
measure, Inflt ≡ 400 ∗∆LPYt.
LW hourly wage (log of) Total compensation taken from the
quarterly national accounts of the
OECD (QNA) and then divided by the
labor volume, see below.
LVol labor input volume of employed
workers (hours, log of)
See the appendix.
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Table 4: ADF unit root tests
variable deterministics lags (∆) sample ADF stat
UR const 4 1980q1-1999q3 −2.41
LEMP trend, const 5 1980q1-1999q3 −2.55
LY trend, const 7 1980q1-1999q3 −2.26
LY trend, const 3 1980q1-1999q3 −2.36
Infl const 5 1980q2-1999q3 −1.53
LWReal trend, const 2 1982q1-1999q3 −2.67
LWReal trend, const 1 1982q1-1999q3 −2.26
LVol trend, const 5 1981q3-1999q3 −3.37
LVol trend, const 7 1982q1-1999q3 −3.89∗
LVol trend, const 5 1982q1-1999q3 −3.65∗
Remarks: Tests are for the 5% and 1% level, an asterisk denotes significance at the 5% level.
Lags refer to lagged differences. Several results per variable are reported if the lag specifica-
tion is ambiguous.
Table 5: Diagnostic tests for the levels VAR with three lags
∆URt ∆LEMPt ∆LYt ∆Inflt ∆LWRealt ∆LV olt
absence of autocorrelation (1-5), F(5,47)
.23 .82 .44 .28 .81 .34
normality, χ2(2)
.42 .16 .63 .25 .41 .22
absence of ARCH (1-4), F(4,30)
.49 .83 .61 .42 .54 .14
Remarks: Sample 1981q2-1999q3. The levels VAR with K = 3 lags is unrestricted in terms
of cointegration. Deterministics: linear trend, constant, an impulse dummy for 1984q1 and its
difference (see text). Numbers are marginal significance levels (p-values).
Table 6: Johansen cointegration test
eigenvalue H0 : r ≤ trace stat. nominal p-
value
Bartlett corrected
trace stat.
0 209** 0.000
0.65 1 132** 0.000
0.51 2 79.4** 0.001 63.0*
0.30 3 52.7** 0.003 42.5*
0.26 4 30.9** 0.009 24.8
0.20 5 14.1* 0.026 12.5*
0.17 6
Remarks: Sample 1981q2-1999q3, 3 lags (i.e. 2 lagged differences), restricted trend and re-
stricted impulse dummy for 1984q1 (see text). Significance denoted by * (5%) and ** (1%).
For the Bartlett correction see the text.
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